光華講壇——社會(huì)名流與企業(yè)家論壇第6614期
主題：小型銀行破產(chǎn)的影響：來(lái)自中國(guó)的證據(jù)The Consequences of a Small Bank Collapse: Evidence from China
主講人：清華大學(xué)五道口金融學(xué)院副教授、國(guó)家金融研究院貨幣政策與金融穩(wěn)定研究中心副主任 周臻
主持人：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)中國(guó)金融研究院副院長(zhǎng) 董青馬教授
時(shí)間：11月2日 10:00—11:30
舉辦地點(diǎn)：柳林校區(qū)格致樓618
主辦單位：金融學(xué)院 中國(guó)金融研究院 科研處
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
周臻，清華大學(xué)五道口金融學(xué)院副教授，國(guó)家金融研究院貨幣政策與金融穩(wěn)定研究中心副主任。紐約大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士?，F(xiàn)階段的主要研究領(lǐng)域是信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論研究以及其在金融中介與銀行監(jiān)管、公司金融、宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)等領(lǐng)域的運(yùn)用，在 American Economic Review，Journal of Economic Theory，Games and Economic Behavior 等一流學(xué)術(shù)期刊上發(fā)表過(guò)多篇論文。研究成果曾經(jīng)獲得中國(guó)信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)優(yōu)秀成果獎(jiǎng)，PwC 3535 論壇年度最佳論文等榮譽(yù)，并入選國(guó)家高層次人才（青年）計(jì)劃。
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
包商銀行破產(chǎn)的處置過(guò)程中，我國(guó)監(jiān)管部門(mén)首次未對(duì)中小銀行進(jìn)行完全救助和擔(dān)保。本文考察了該例監(jiān)管首次偏離了市場(chǎng)的長(zhǎng)期剛性?xún)陡额A(yù)期處置的影響?；陔p重差分法，本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，包商銀行事件后，在同業(yè)存單市場(chǎng)，相比于系統(tǒng)重要性銀行，非系統(tǒng)重要性銀行（中小銀行）的融資成本（信用利差）顯著增加，同時(shí)融資比率下降。包商銀行事件導(dǎo)致的非系統(tǒng)重要性銀行融資困難具有顯著性和持久性，并引起部分中小銀行（如錦州銀行、恒豐銀行等）陷入融資困境。從事后角度分析，包商銀行事件引起了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳染，且可能一定程度上影響金融系統(tǒng)穩(wěn)定。本文探索了其中的傳染機(jī)制，發(fā)現(xiàn)包商銀行事件降低了市場(chǎng)對(duì)未來(lái)政府救助非系統(tǒng)重要性銀行的信心。從事前角度分析，消除市場(chǎng)隱形擔(dān)保預(yù)期有助于提高定價(jià)效率、改善信貸分配。相比于系統(tǒng)重要性銀行，非系統(tǒng)重要性銀行股票價(jià)格下跌、債權(quán)人的監(jiān)督意愿提高以及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)降低。
Upon assuming control of Baoshang Bank, Chinese bank regulators announced that they would eschew bailing out large creditors of this city-level distressed bank in full. This paper investigates the consequences of this unexpected deviation from the long-standing full bailout policy. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that this event significantly increased credit spreads and decreased the funding ratio of negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD) issued by systemically unimportant (SU) banks relative to those issued by systemically important(SI) banks. The deterioration of funding conditions for other SU banks is economically significant and persistent, resulting in the distress of those small banks. We provide additional evidence to show that the underlying mechanism of this contagion and ex post financial instability is a decline in market confidence regarding future bailouts for SU banks. Ex-ante, however, it is found that the induced implicit non- guarantee improves price efficiency and credit allocation, lowers equity prices, strengthens creditors' monitoring, and reduces the risk-taking among SU banks relative to SI banks. Finally, additional evidence on credit line extension and utilization is presented to illustrate the real effects of this contagion caused by the unanticipated bailout policy change.
